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_______________________________ _ __________________ Preface / Research Team

Preface
This project was commissioned by the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The database of fraud cases was developed in
preparation of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public
Companies, copyright Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO), 1999. We appreciate helpful comments received from Heather Hermanson, Wendy
Lu, and the Fraud Standard Steering Task Force of the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board.

Research Team
This research was conducted on behalf of the Auditing Standards Board by a team of three
academic researchers: Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. All
three team members are co-authors of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (COSO 1999). All three are Ph.D.s and CPAs who have
worked extensively as auditors with a large international accounting firm. Brief biographical
summaries for each of the researchers are provided at the back of this monograph.
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SECTION I — Executive Summary
This study examines fraud-related SEC enforcement actions against auditors from January
1987 - December 1997 to identify the settings in which auditors were cited by the SEC, as
well as the alleged deficiencies in the audit process that caused the auditors to be cited. By
examining these alleged audit problems, we hope to offer insights for auditors and regulators
to consider as they work to continuously improve the auditing profession’s ability to detect
instances of material financial statement fraud.
The data in this study were obtained from Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (copyright COSO, 1999). The COSO fraud study
provided an analysis of 204 financial fraud cases investigated by the SEC from January 1987
- December 1997. The present study examines the 56 of 204 cases from the COSO study in
which the auditor was cited by the SEC in an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release
(AAER).

The key results of the present study are as follows:
•

From 1987-1997, SEC enforcement actions against auditors were quite rare,
particularly against auditors employed by national audit firms (top 10 firms). The
sample used in this study, which comprises two-thirds of the known financial
statement fraud cases from 1987-1997, included only 56 fraud cases with SEC
actions against auditors. Only 10 of these 56 cases involved auditors employed
by national audit firms. None of the actions against national firm personnel was
against the audit firm itself (only against individual personnel involved in the
audit engagement).

•

The subsample of financial fraud cases in which the auditor was cited appears to
differ substantially from the overall sample of 204 fraud cases examined in the
COSO fraud study (1999). Relative to the 204 cases, the 56 instances in which
the auditor was cited by the SEC involved very small companies, a concentration
in the mining / oil and gas industries, less top executive (CEO / CFO)
involvement in the frauds, larger frauds relative to the size of the companies, and
a concentration of asset overstatement frauds.

•

Of the 56 cases in which the auditor was named, 11 cases appear to involve
“bogus audits” or “bogus auditors.” In such cases, either an audit was never
performed, or a non-CPA posed as an auditor and issued a phony opinion. The
primary penalty in these cases involved barring the perpetrators from practice
before the SEC.

•

In the other 45 cases, it appears that an audit was attempted, but was deficient.
Auditor turnover (58 percent of cases), early stage companies, and new audit
engagements were engagement characteristics present in many of these cases. In
5 of the 45 cases (11 percent), it appeared that a key member of the client
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management team had come from the audit firm. Auditor penalties primarily
involved bars (for a period of time or permanently) from practice before the SEC.

•

In the 45 attempted, but deficient, audits, the most common alleged audit
problems were:
• failure to gather adequate audit evidence
• lack of due professional care
• lack of appropriate professional skepticism
• misinterpretation or misapplication of GAAP
• inadequate audit planning
• over-reliance on inquiry as a form of evidence
• failure to obtain adequate evidence in support of management estimates
• inadequate confirmation of accounts receivable
• failure to recognize or disclose key related parties
• over-reliance on internal controls
• lack of independence (generally due to the auditor performing accounting
or management functions for the client)
• inadequate supervision and review
• inadequate or inconsistent working papers.

•

Differences were identified between national firm audits and non-national firm
audits. Over-reliance on internal controls, inadequate cutoff tests of transactions,
and improper evaluation of known audit differences were among the most
common problems in national firm audits, but not in non-national firm audits.
Inadequate confirmation of accounts receivable, failure to recognize or disclose
key related parties, and lack of independence were among the most common
problems in non-national firm audits, but not in national firm audits (e.g., there
were no independence violations at all among national firm auditors).

Based on the pattern of results found, the key implications for auditors and regulators to
consider are as follows:
•

When assessing the nature of audit problems highlighted in the SEC enforcement
actions, it is important to remember the rare nature of these documented audit
problems and to carefully consider the costs and benefits of potential responses to
the problems.

•

Auditors may need to pay particular attention to very small clients (which may
lack a baseline level of internal controls) and unique industry risks. Fraud cases
in which accounts receivable, oil, gas, and minerals, or investments were
misstated appeared to pose the greatest risk to the audit firm. Special care should
be taken in auditing such areas, including the need to consider the use of a
specialist to assist in assessing asset valuations.
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•

The SEC recently announced an effort to work more closely with federal criminal
prosecutors in bringing criminal charges in egregious financial fraud cases. We
would expect future instances of bogus audits or bogus auditors to be prime
candidates for criminal prosecution.

•

Auditors need to be alert to the unique risks posed at the beginning of a client
relationship and should be especially vigilant when making inquiries of
predecessor auditors before client acceptance, and during planning and
performing the first few annual audits for those accepted client engagements.
Also, consistent with the Independence Standards Board’s focus on auditors
accepting employment with clients, auditors should consider the risks associated
with client relationships when an audit firm member joins the client’s executive
team and adjust the audit approach accordingly to ensure independence and
objectivity are maintained.

•

The three most common audit deficiencies (inadequate evidence, lack of due care,
and inadequate professional skepticism) represent global shortcomings in the
audit process or the auditor’s frame of mind when performing the audit. Perhaps
the most appropriate way to address these global issues is through the audit firms’
explicitly sharing their culture and emphasizing their philosophy towards a
baseline level of acceptable audit quality (over and above audit profitability goals)
with their professionals at all levels. A second area to consider is the types of
incentives created by the audit firm’s performance measures and compensation
system. In many cases, it appeared that auditors simply chose not to pursue or
consider identified issues due to perceived pressures, such as pressures from tight
time schedules and time budgets.

•

Numerous specific areas of concern are raised in the other alleged audit
deficiencies. Several of these may have implications for specific auditing
standards or specific elements of a firm’s audit approach. Key auditing standards
related to these problems include SAS No. 69 (The Meaning ofPresent Fairly in
Conformity With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the Independent
Auditor’s Report), SAS No. 22 (Planning and Supervision), SAS No. 82
{Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit), SAS No. 85
{Management Representations), SAS No. 57 {Auditing Accounting Estimates),
SAS No. 67 {The Confirmation Process), and SAS No. 45 {Related Parties).

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section II briefly outlines the research
approach. Section III contains the results from our detailed analysis of 56 alleged cases of
fraudulent financial reporting in which the auditor was named in an enforcement action. The
detailed analysis in Section III produced numerous insights for further consideration. Section
IV highlights implications applicable to external auditors and regulators of the audit market.

We believe that this report will prove helpful to parties concerned with auditor performance.
We hope it will stimulate greater awareness of new opportunities for improvements in the
auditing process.
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SECTION II — Description of Research Approach
In preparing Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public
Companies (copyright COSO, 1999), we developed a database of alleged financial statement
frauds committed by U.S. public companies. To identify instances of fraudulent financial
reporting investigated by the SEC in the period 1987-1997, we read all Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC between January 1987 and
December 1997. From our reading, we identified all AAERs that involved an alleged
violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act, or other federal antifraud statutes.
Our reading of AAERs during this period allowed us to identify nearly 300 companies
involved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial reporting. We randomly selected
approximately 200 companies to serve as the final sample for analysis in Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (copyright COSO,
1999).
Of the 200 fraud cases examined in detail, 56 of the cases involved some type of SEC action
against the auditor. These 56 cases serve as the sample examined in the present study. For
each of these 56 cases, we collected extensive information from our reading of (a) AAERs
related to the alleged fraud, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the
alleged financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged
fraud period, and (d) business press articles written about the sample companies after the
fraud was revealed. The purpose of this data collection is to provide a description of
company characteristics, fraud characteristics, auditor characteristics, and apparent
deficiencies in auditor performance.

In examining the apparent deficiencies in the audit process, we focused on the following
aspects of the audit:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Engagement acceptance
General GAAS standards (e.g., independence, competence, due care)
Audit planning
Understanding internal controls
Sufficient competent evidence
Reporting
Other matters identified in the AAERs.

The goal is to understand which areas of the audit process appear to be causing SEC
enforcement actions against auditors. In other words, “where are the auditing problems?”
Readers should recognize that, despite our best efforts to collect complete data for all 56
cases, the data sources used often were incomplete. For example, AAERs were uneven in
their level of disclosure, and other sources (e.g., Form 10-Ks, etc.) often were not available.
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In addition to data availability issues, readers also should recognize that a great deal of
professional judgment was necessary as we collected and synthesized the data. We believe
that we have been reasonable and consistent in our judgments, but the research approach is
limited by the quality of our judgments.
Finally, it is important to note that the sample of audit problems examined in this study relies
on the enforcement strategies and efforts of the SEC — both enforcement regarding financial
fraud in general (which is the basis for the 204 company sample) and regarding auditor
problems (which is the basis for the 56 company sample). In light of the SEC’s constrained
resources, it is possible that there are financial statement fraud cases not represented in the
population of SEC enforcement actions, and it is possible that some auditor problems are not
reflected in SEC enforcement actions.
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SECTION III — Detailed Analysis of Fraud-Related
SEC Enforcement Actions Against Auditors: 1987-1997
This section contains a summary of the key findings from our reading of AAERs related to
each of the 56 cases, Form 10-Ks filed before and during the period the alleged financial
statement fraud occurred, proxy statements issued during the alleged fraud period, and
business press articles written about the sample companies after the fraud was disclosed.

The results are presented as follows: (a) nature of the 56 sample companies, (b) nature of the
control environment (top management and the audit committee), (c) nature of the frauds, (d)
consequences of the frauds, (e) comparison of the 56 companies to the full COSO fraud study
sample of 204 companies, and (f) auditor issues, including alleged deficiencies in auditor
performance.
A. NATURE OF 56 SAMPLE COMPANIES

Financial Profile of Sample Companies

We were able to obtain the “last clean” financial statements (last financial statements before
the fraud period) for 24 of the 56 sample companies.1 Table 1 highlights selected financial
statement information for these 24 companies.
The sample companies are small in size. While total assets, total revenues, and stockholder’s
equity averaged $62 million, $54 million, and $27 million, respectively, the median of total
assets was only $5.4 million, the median of total revenues was only $1.4 million, and the
median of stockholder’s equity was only $2.7 million in the period ending before the fraud
began. Most of the sample companies operated well under the $50 million size range.
Many of the sample companies were financially stressed in the period preceding the fraud
period. The median net income was near zero, with over half of companies facing net losses.

1 Some last clean financial statements were not publicly available, as the fraud involved the financial statements
included with the initial public offering.
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Table 1 - Financial Profile of Sample Companies (n=24 companies)
Last Financial Statements Prior to Beginning of Fraud Period

(in 000’s)
Total Assets
$62,288

Total
Revenues
$54,199

Net
Income (Loss)
$5,715

Stockholders’
Equity (Deficit)
$26,732

$5,371

$1,373

($1)

$2,737

$0

$0

($8,484)

($424)

1st Quartile

$1,338

$309

($270)

$741

3rd Quartile

$37,931

$18,219

$1,350

$8,661

Maximum Value

$837,235

$924,294

$120,413

$457,252

Mean
Median
Minimum Value

Stock Exchange Listings

We reviewed the AAERs and the last clean financial statements to identify the stock
exchange where each of the companies’ stock traded. We were able to identify the stock
exchange listing for 37 of the 56 sample companies. As indicated in Table 2, most (87
percent) were traded in over-the-counter markets.2 Approximately 8 percent of the
companies’ stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and approximately 5 percent of
the companies’ stock traded on the American Stock Exchange.
Table 2 - Sample Companies’ Stock Exchange Listing

Stock Exchange
New York Stock Exchange
American Stock Exchange
Over-the-counter markets
Number of sample companies
with available stock
exchange information

Number of Companies
3
2
32

Percentage of
Companies
8%
5%
87%

37

100%

2

Over-the-counter markets include stocks traded on the NASDAQ National Market System, the NASDAQ
Small-Cap Market, electronic bulletin boards, pink sheets, and other situations where investors contact dealers
(brokers) when they want to buy or sell a security.
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Industries for Companies Involved

We reviewed the information included in the AAERs to determine the primary industry in
which the fraud companies operated. We were able to identify the primary industry for 49 of
the 56 sample companies. For the companies where we were able to identify the primary
industry, the industries affected most frequently included mining / oil and gas (16 percent),
computer hardware and software (12 percent), and financial services (12 percent). See Table
3.

Table 3 - Primary Industries of Sample Companies

Industry Classification
Mining / Oil and gas
Computer hardware / software
Financial service providers
Healthcare and health products
Retailers / Wholesalers
Other service providers
Insurance
Other manufacturers
Telecommunication companies
Miscellaneous

Total

Number of Fraud
Companies in
Industry
8
6
6
4
4
4
4
2
2
9

Percentage
of Fraud
Companies
16%
12%
12%
8%
8%
8%
8%
4%
4%
20%

49

100%

B. NATURE OF THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT (TOP MANAGEMENT AND
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE)

Individuals Named in the AAERs

From our reading of the AAERs related to the 56 sample companies, we captured
information about the types of company representatives and outsiders named in an AAER
related to each instance of alleged fraudulent financial reporting. We captured all individuals
listed in any of the AAERs related to an instance of fraudulent financial reporting, whether
these individuals were charged with fraud or charged with other lesser violations. Even
though these individuals were named in an AAER, there is no certain evidence that all the
named participants violated the antifraud statutes. In addition, most of the named
participants explicitly admitted no guilt of any kind, although they frequently consented to
the SEC’s actions.
Using the highest managerial title for an individual, we summarized the typical employee
positions involved. For example, if one individual had the titles of chief financial officer
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(CFO) and controller, we report that as involving strictly the CFO position in our reporting in
Table 4 below. As noted in Table 4, the senior executive most frequently named in an
AAER was the chief executive officer (CEO). The CEO was named as one of the parties
involved in 61 percent of the cases. The second most frequently identified senior executive
named was the CFO. The CFO was named in 29 percent of the cases. When considered
together, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 68 percent of the frauds.
Table 4 - Types and Frequencies of Individuals Named

Individual’s Relation to Company
Chief executive officer (CEO)
Chief financial officer (CFO)
Either or both CEO or CFO involved
Controller
Chief operating officer (COO)
Other vice president positions
Board of Director (non-management)
Lower level personnel
Auditors
No titles given
Other titles

# of Companies
34
16
38
7
3
8
5
4
56*
11
5

Percentage of
Fraud Cases
61%
29%
68%
13%
5%
14%
9%
7%
100%*
20%
9%

* This study addresses only those cases in which the auditor
was named in an AAER.

Audit Committee Characteristics
We gathered information on the audit committee from the proxy statements, which were
available for 19 of the sample fraud companies. The proxies used were those closest to the
end of the fraud period, so as to capture the nature of the audit committee during the fraud
period.

Throughout this section, the following definitions are used:
■

Inside director - Officer or employee of the company or a subsidiary, officer of an
affiliated company.

■

Gray director - Former officers or employees of the company, a subsidiary, or an
affiliate; relatives of management; professional advisors to the company; officers
or owners of significant suppliers or customers of the company; interlocking
directors; officers or employees of other companies controlled by the CEO or the
company’s majority owner; owners of an affiliate company; those who are
creditors of the company.
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■

Outside director - No disclosed relationship (other than stock ownership) between
the director and the company or its officers.

As reported in Table 5, 68 percent of the fraud companies ostensibly had an audit committee.
These audit committees generally had three members, and they were typically composed of
outside directors. On average, outside directors represented over 65 percent of the audit
committee members. Overall, the audit committees appear to be reasonably independent,
although the average audit committee composition of 67 percent outside directors is not
consistent with the views of most reform proponents who call for audit committees
composed entirely of outside directors.

Most of the audit committee members did not appear to be experts in accounting or finance.
Only 30 percent of the audit committee members were certified as a Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) or Certified Financial Analyst (CFA) or had current or prior work
experience in serving as a CFO, VP of finance, controller, treasurer, auditor, banker,
investment banker, financial consultant, investment manager, or venture capitalist.

The average number of audit committee meetings per year was 1.9, with a median of 1.5.
Some may question whether audit committees that meet only one or two times per year are
functioning effectively when a public company at a minimum files financial statements with
the SEC four times per year.
Finally, the audit committee disclosures provided evidence of an internal audit function only
10 percent of the time. Such a percentage appears reasonable in light of the small size of the
sample companies.

11

Fraud-Related SEC Enforcement Actions Against Auditors: 1987-1997
Table 5 - Audit Committee Profile
# of Companies
With Information

Result

Existence of audit committee

19

68% had audit committee

Number of audit committee
members

12

Mean = 3.1

Type of audit committee
member:
Insider
Gray

12

Percentage of audit committee
members with accounting or
finance expertise

12

29.7%

Number of audit committee
meetings per year

10

Mean =1.9
Median =1.5

Audit committee disclosures
provide evidence of an internal
audit function

10

10% mentioned internal audit
function

Item

Mean = 11%
Mean = 22%

C. NATURE OF THE FRAUDS

Total Amount of the Fraud
In an attempt to obtain a judgmental measure of the typical size of the financial statement
frauds, we accumulated information from the AAERs that provided some indication of the
amounts involved. In many cases, the AAERs did not disclose the dollar amounts involved.
As a result, we were only able to obtain some measure of the dollar amounts involved for 43
of the 56 sample companies. As reported in Table 6, on an overall cumulative basis, the
average fraud involved $33 million of cumulative misstatement or misappropriation over the
fraud period, while the median fraud involved $4.4 million. The smallest fraud was $29,000,
while the largest totaled $362 million.
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Table 6 - Cumulative Dollar Amount of Fraud Per Company

# of Sample
Companies
With
Information

Mean
Cumulative
Misstatement or
Misappropriation
(in $ millions)

Median
Cumulative
Misstatement or
Misappropriation
(in $ millions)

43

$33.0

$4.4

Cumulative Amount of
Fraud Per Company

Minimum = $29,000
Maximum = $362 million
1st quartile = $1.6 million
3rd quartile = $26 million

Typical Length of Fraud Period

The financial statement frauds generally involved multiple fiscal periods. Information to
determine the number of months from the beginning of the first fraud period to the end of the
last fraud period was available for 55 of the 56 sample companies. For those 55 companies,
the time from the beginning of the first fraud period to the end of the last fraud period
averaged 27.2 months with a median of 24 months. Most of the fraud periods overlapped a
portion of two fiscal years by misstating either the annual or quarterly financial statements in
at least two fiscal periods. Many of the frauds began with misstatements of interim financial
statements that were continued in annual financial statement filings.
Methods of Fraudulently Reporting Financial Statement Information
Based upon information included in the AAERs, we made our best attempt at identifying the
methods used to fraudulently report the financial statement information. As noted in Table 7,
the two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate financial statement
information involved improper techniques to overstate assets and improper revenue
recognition techniques to overstate revenues.

Sixty-eight percent of the sample companies overstated assets, primarily by overvaluing
existing assets. Thirty-four percent of the sample companies recorded revenues
inappropriately primarily by recording revenues prematurely or by creating fictitious revenue
transactions. Sixteen percent of the companies’ financial statements were misstated through
the understatement of expenses or liabilities. Most of the financial statement fraud instances
involved intentionally misstating financial statement information, with only 13 percent of the
fraud cases involving misappropriation of company assets.
To avoid double-counting, the information about the overstatement of assets does not include overstatements
of accounts receivable due to the revenue recognition frauds.
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Four percent of the companies issued statements or press releases with inappropriate
disclosures (without financial statement line item effects). There were a variety of other
miscellaneous fraud techniques used. Because the financial statement frauds at the sample
companies often involved more than one fraud technique, the sum of the percentages
reported exceeds l00 percent.

Table 7 - Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques

Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements

Percentage of the 56 Sample
Companies Using a Fraud
Method

Overstatement of Assets (excluding accounts
receivable overstatements due to revenue fraud): a
Overstating existing assets - 54%
Recording fictitious assets or
assets not owned - 16%
Capitalizing items that
should be expensed - 7%

68%

Improper Revenue Recognition: a
Recording fictitious revenues - 18%
Recording revenues prematurely - 11%
No description / “overstated” - 11%

34%

Understatement of Expenses/Liabilities

16%

Misappropriation of Assets

13%

Inappropriate Disclosure (with no financial
statement line item effects)

4%

Other Miscellaneous Techniques

33%

Note: The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the
category totals due to multiple types of fraud employed at a single company.

Over two-thirds of the sample companies misstated the financial statement information by
overstating assets. Table 8 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by sample
companies. Even excluding the effects of misstating accounts receivable due to the revenue
recognition frauds, the most common asset account misstated was accounts receivable (issues
primarily related to assessing collectibility). Other asset accounts misstated included
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investments; oil, gas, and mineral assets; property, plant, and equipment; and patents,
copyrights, and designs.
Table 8 - Asset Accounts Frequently Misstated

Asset Accounts Typically
Overstated
Accounts Receivable
(other than revenue fraud)
Investments
Oil, Gas, & Minerals
Property, Plant, & Equipment
Patents, Copyrights, & Designs
Inventory
Cash
Marketable Securities
Loans/Notes Receivable

# of Sample
Companies Involved

10

7
7
6
6
5
4
3
2

D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRAUDS

We identified 21 (38 percent) of the 56 sample companies that either filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, were described as “defunct” in the AAER, or were taken over by a state or
federal regulator after the fraud occurred.4 We also found that an additional five companies
(9 percent) either sold a large portion of their assets, merged with another company, or had a
new controlling shareholder following the occurrence of the financial statement fraud. Thus,
nearly 50 percent of the companies were no longer in existence or were under a substantially
different form of ownership and existence following the fraud period. We identified 10
companies (18 percent) whose stock was delisted from the national stock exchange where the
stock was traded. See Table 9.

4 Frequencies of consequences reported in this section are inherently understated given that we were only able
to identify consequences explicitly noted in an AAER or in business press articles. Given that the business
press often does not cover smaller or otherwise less visible companies, there are likely to be consequences that
occurred that we were unable to identify for our sample firms (which tend to be very small).
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Table 9 - Status of Companies After Fraud Disclosed

Number of Sample
Companies
Affected

Percentage of
Sample
Companies
Affected

Bankrupt, defunct, taken over by regulator
Changed ownership
(Sold large portion of assets,
merged with another company, or
experienced change in controlling
shareholders)
Total

21

38%

5
26

9%
47%

Delisted from national stock exchange

10

18%

Company Status Subsequent to the Fraud

E. COMPARISON OF 56 SAMPLE COMPANIES TO 204 COMPANY SAMPLE IN
COSO FRAUD STUDY (1999)

The preceding sections have presented various descriptions of the 56 fraud cases in which the
auditor was named in an AAER. These 56 cases appear to be quite different from the full
sample of 204 fraud cases examined in Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. Key differences are summarized below.
•

Nature of the Companies - The sample of 56 consists of much smaller companies than
the full sample. For example, median revenues for the 56 were $1.4 million, versus $13
million for the full sample. In addition, the sample of 56 has a concentration of mining /
oil and gas companies (16 percent), the most frequent industry in this subsample. This
industry represents only 6 percent of the full sample examined in the COSO fraud study.

•

Nature of the Control Environment - The sample of 56 has less frequent CEO and
CFO involvement in the frauds (68 percent) than does the full sample (83 percent).

•

Nature of the Frauds - The cumulative amounts of the frauds appear larger in the
sample of 56 (median fraud of $4.4 million is almost as large as median assets of $5.4
million) than in the full sample (median fraud of $4.1 million is much smaller than
median assets of $15.7 million). Also, in the sample of 56, the frauds were weighted
toward asset frauds (68 percent) and away from revenue frauds (34 percent). Asset and
revenue frauds each were found in 50 percent of the full sample of cases in the COSO
fraud study. Finally, in the sample of 56, the asset accounts misstated were more likely
to be accounts receivable; oil, gas, and minerals; or investments; whereas in the COSO
study the accounts involved inventory, accounts receivable, and property, plant, and
equipment.
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F. AUDITOR ISSUES, INCLUDING ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN AUDITOR
PERFORMANCE
Audit Opinions

We reviewed the auditor’s opinion on the last set of financial statements that were
fraudulently misstated to determine whether the auditor’s report contained any modifications
or qualifications. For the 36 sample fraud companies where we were able to review the
auditor’s report, we determined that 18 of those audit reports (50 percent) contained
unqualified auditor opinions (“clean” opinions). The remaining reports (50 percent) departed
from the standard unqualified report for a variety of reasons (in some cases more than one
reason caused the modification). Eight reports mentioned going-concern issues, and only one
report mentioned GAAP departures. See Table 10.

Table 10 - Types of Audit Reports on Last Fraudulent Financial Statements

Number of
Reports by
Type

Percentage of
Audit Reports by
Type

Unqualified opinions

18

50%

Modified or qualified reports
Going concern - 8 reports
Litigation uncertainties - 2 reports
Other uncertainties - 4 reports
Change in accounting principle - 3 reports
Change in auditor across
comparative reporting periods - 3 reports
GAAP departures - 1 report

17

47%

1

3%

36

100%

Type of Audit Report

Note: The above do not sum to equal the 17 modified or
qualified reports because some of the reports addressed more
than one modification/qualification issue.

Disclaimers of opinion

Number of audit reports available for review

Alleged Auditor Involvement in the Frauds
Of the 56 cases in which the auditor was named, 11 cases appear to involve “bogus audits” or
“bogus auditors.” In such cases, either an audit was never performed, or a non-CPA posed as
an auditor and issued a phony opinion. In the other 45 cases, it appears that an audit was
attempted, but was deficient. Three types of auditors were cited - those employed by
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national (top 10) audit firms (10 cases), those employed by non-national audit firms (42
cases), and non-CPAs posing as auditors (4 cases). See Table 11.

Table 11 - Alleged Auditor Involvement by Auditor Type

Type of Case

Number of
Cases
Naming
National Firm
Auditors

Number of
Cases Naming
Non-National
Firm
Auditors

Number of
Cases
Involving NonCPAs Posing
as Auditors

Total

Bogus audit or auditor

0

7

4

11

Attempted audit, but
audit was deficient

10

35

0

45

10

42

4

56

Total

Bogus Audits or Auditors
Eleven of the 56 cases involved instances in which an actual auditor did not perform an audit
(but still issued an opinion) or someone posed as an auditor and issued a phony opinion.
These 11 cases do not represent failures in the performance of actual audits. Rather they
represent situations in which a valid audit was not attempted. See Table 12.

Table 12 - Bogus Audits or Auditors (n = 11)

Item

Result

Type of “auditor” violation

All antifraud violations (Rule 10(b)-5)

“Auditor” paid civil penalty

In 2 cases (fines of $50,000 and
$10,000)

“Auditor” disgorged gains

In 1 case ($15,000)

Criminal prosecutions

None

Barred from SEC practice

In 5 cases (three permanent, one for 5
years, one for 3 years)
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These 11 cases may represent the most egregious violations of the anti-fraud statutes,
particularly Rule 10(b)-5. Despite the seriousness of the violations, the penalties imposed on
the perpetrators by the SEC appear to be fairly light. Only limited fines were imposed and no
criminal convictions resulted from these 11 cases. The primary penalty involved barring the
perpetrators from practice before the SEC.

Audit Problems in Attempted Audits
The remaining 45 cases represent instances of alleged failure in attempted audits. Tables 1318 present information on these 45 cases as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

13 - Overview of Attempted Audits and Sanctions (n = 45)
14 - Detailed Listing of Alleged Audit Problems by Audit Area (n = 45)
15 - Key Problems in Attempted Audits (Full sample, n = 45)
16 - Key Problems in National Firm Attempted Audits (n = 10)
17 - Key Problems in Non-National Firm Attempted Audits (n = 35)
18 - Other Alleged Audit Problems
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Table 13 - Overview of Attempted Audits and Sanctions (n = 45)

Item

Result

Type of auditor violation

19 antifraud violations (Rule
10(b)-5), all against non
national firm auditors
26 citations for negligent audits

Auditor change

An auditor change had taken place in
11 of 19 cases (58%) containing
enough information to evaluate

Company was new or audit in
question was initial audit

17 of 45 cases

Former auditor worked for client

In 5 of 45 cases (two in CFO position,
two in controller position, one other
relationship)

Auditor paid civil penalty

In 1 case (fine of $29,000)

Auditor disgorged gains

In 2 cases (small amounts)

Criminal prosecutions

In 1 case (for contempt and
misappropriation)

Auditor barred from SEC practice

In 38 cases (12 permanent, others
averaged approximately 3 years)

As noted in Table 13 above, in 19 of the 45 attempted audits, the auditor was cited for
violating Rule 10(b)-5 or aiding and abetting a 10(b)-5 violation. In the other 26 cases, the
auditor was cited for negligence in performing the audit.

Of the 19 cases in which there was adequate information to evaluate whether a recent auditor
change had occurred, there were 11 instances (58 percent) where such a change had occurred.
In addition, there was evidence that 17 of the 45 companies either were relatively new or the
audit in question was the initial audit. Overall, it appears that engagements involving auditor
turnover, early stage companies, and new audit engagements may present increased risk to
the auditor.

Another issue of interest today (e.g., an Independence Standards Board initiative) is whether
there were former audit personnel (i.e., from the company’s external audit firm) employed in
key management positions at the client firm. We found evidence of such relationships in 5 of
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the 45 cases (11 percent). In two cases the former auditor was the CFO, and in another two
cases the former auditor was the controller. In the final case, the AAER stated that a person
had worked for the client and for the audit firm (at different times), but the discussion was
not very detailed.

In terms of sanctions against auditors, civil fines, disgorgement of gains, and criminal
prosecution were quite rare. Auditor penalties primarily involved bars from SEC practice. Of
the 38 cases in which an auditor was barred from practicing before the SEC, 12 (32 percent)
involved permanent bars, while the remaining SEC bars averaged approximately 3 years.
Table 14 presents a comprehensive listing of all alleged audit problems noted in the AAERs
organized by issues related to engagement acceptance, the general standards of GAAS, the
fieldwork standards of GAAS, and the reporting standards of GAAS so readers can focus on
audit areas of interest and determine the extent of problems in those areas. For each area,
three numbers are presented - the total number of cases (out of 45) in which this area
represented an audit problem, the number of National Firm audits (out of 10) in which this
area represented an audit problem, and the number of Non-National Firm audits (out of 35)
in which this area represented an audit problem. The split between national and non-national
firms is provided due to the different nature of these two groups of audit firms. Also note
that if there were no problems in an audit area (e.g., referencing work performed by other
auditors), the area is not listed in Table 14. Following this comprehensive listing of all noted
problems, we present and discuss information in later tables about the most frequently
observed audit problems for the full sample and then for each of the two sub-samples,
national and non-national firms.
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Table 14 - Detailed Listing of Alleged Audit Problems
by Audit Area (n = 45)
Number of Cases With Problems
[Total (out of n = 45) /
National Firms (out of n = 10) /
Non-National Firms (out of n = 35)]

Audit Area
Panel A:
Engagement Acceptance
a. Failure to conduct adequate
predecessor / successor
communications

5 Total / 0 National / 5 Non-National

b. Failure to obtain
understanding with client
(e.g., engagement letter)

1/1/0

c. Inadequate assessment /
consideration of
management’s integrity

7/2/5

Panel B:
General GAAS Standards
a. Lack of independence from
client

10/0/10
• 6 involved auditor performing accounting
or management functions for client
• 2 involved auditor ownership of company
stock

b. Inadequate competence and
technical training to conduct
engagement

6/0/6

c. Failure to exercise due
professional care

32/9/23

d. Inappropriate level of
professional skepticism
applied

27/10/17
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Table 14 - Continued
Number of Cases With Problems
[Total (out of n = 45) /
National Firms (out of n = 10) /
Non-National Firms (out of n = 35)]

Audit Area
Panel C:
Audit Planning - Fieldwork GAAS
Standard
a. Inadequate design of audit
programs and poor
assessment of engagement
risk (inherent risk issues, non
routine transactions)

20/5/15
• 7 involved failure to write an audit
program

b. Failure to recognize / ensure
disclosure of key related
parties

12/1/11

c. Inadequate supervision and
review of engagement

10/3/7

Panel D:
Understanding Internal Controls Fieldwork GAAS Standard
a. Failure to obtain adequate
understanding of internal
control

7/1/6

b. Over-reliance on internal
controls (over-relying / failing
to react to known control
weaknesses)

11/5/6

c. Failure to consider particular
risks related to the control
environment

1/0/1
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Table 14 - Continued

Number of Cases With Problems
[Total (out of n = 45) /
National Firms (out of n = 10) /
Non-National Firms (out of n = 35)1

Audit Area
Panel E:
Sufficient Competent Evidence Fieldwork GAAS Standard
a. Inappropriate confirming of
accounts receivable

13/2/11
• 5 involved failure to confirm
• 5 involved lax procedures leading to client
falsifying confirmations
• 4 involved failure to perform alternate
procedures

b. Inappropriate confirming of
cash or investments

5/2/3

c. Inadequate observation of
inventories

4/1/3

d. Poor performance of
substantive analytical
procedures

2/1/1

e. Failure to perform adequate
cutoff tests of transactions

5/3/2
• 3 involved sales
• 1 involved cash
• 1 involved investments

f

Failure to seek / obtain
adequate supporting evidence
(failing to gather sufficient
evidence)

g. Failure to obtain adequate
evidence related to the
evaluation of significant
management estimates
(failing to gather sufficient
evidence)

36/10/26

16/7/9
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Table 14 - Continued

Panel E (continued):
h. Over-reliance on / failure to
obtain work of specialists
(e.g., failing to obtain
understanding of methods and
assumptions)

6/2/4

i.

Incorrect sampling techniques
(failing to project results to
population)

2/1/1

j.

Inadequately considering
responses from client’s legal
counsel / attorney letters

2/1/1

k. Using inquiry as sole form of
evidence (over-relying on this
form of evidence)

l.

Not obtaining or over-relying
on management’s letter of
representation

m. Inadequate or inconsistent
preparation of working paper
documentation (inadequate or
inconsistent working papers)

18/8/10

6/1/5
• 4 involved failure to obtain letter
• 2 involved over-reliance on letter
10/3/7
• 7 involved inadequate working papers
• 3 involved material inconsistencies in the
working papers
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Table 14 - Continued

Number of Cases With Problems
[Total (out of n = 45) /
National Firms (out of n = 10) /
Non-National Firms (out of n = 35)]

Audit Area
Panel F:
Reporting GAAS Standards
a. Incorrect interpretation or
application of requirements
of GAAP

22/7/15

b. Failure to report changes in
accounting principle

1/1/0

c. Inadequate evaluation of
impact of uncertainties

1/0/1

d. Inadequate evaluation of
entity’s going concern status

1/1/0

e. Inappropriate consideration of 5/1/4
material subsequent events
f. Failure to evaluate known
audit differences / improperly
concluding that “passed”
audit adjustments were
immaterial

7/3/4

g. Failure to communicate
reportable conditions (and
other required
communications) to the audit
committee

2/0/2

h. Failure to evaluate adequacy
of disclosure or willful
concealing of material items
(not including RPTs)

8/2/6

Note: Audit areas are listed only if there

were alleged problems in those areas.
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The next three tables take the detailed information presented in Table 14 above and sort it to
highlight the most common alleged audit problems - for the full sample of 45 cases, the
national firm sample of 10 cases, and the non-national firm sample of 35 cases.

Table 15 - Key Problems in Attempted Audits (Full Sample, n = 45)

Percentage
(Number) of Cases

Problem Area

•

Seeking / obtaining adequate supporting evidence (failing to
gather sufficient evidence)

80% (36 cases)

•

Due professional care

71% (32)

•

Appropriate level of professional skepticism

60% (27)

•

Interpreting or applying requirements of GAAP

49% (22)

Designing audit programs and planning engagement
(inherent risk issues, non-routine transactions)

44% (20)

Using inquiry as form of evidence (over-relying on this
form of evidence)

40% (18)

Obtaining adequate evidence related to the evaluation of
significant management estimates (failing to gather
sufficient evidence)

36% (16)

•

Confirming accounts receivable

29% (13)

•

Recognizing / disclosing key related parties

27% (12)

Relying on internal controls (over-relying / failing to react
to known control weaknesses)

24% (11)

•

Independence from client

22% (10)

•

Supervising and reviewing engagement

22% (10)

Preparing working paper documentation (inadequate or
inconsistent working papers)

22% (10)

•

•
•

•

•

As shown in Table 15, the most common audit problem involved the failure to gather
adequate audit evidence. In some cases, this was a pervasive statement by the SEC, while in
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other cases the AAERs highlighted specific areas for which the evidence gathered by the
auditor was insufficient. For example, many of the cases involved inadequate evidence in the
areas of asset valuation, asset ownership (assets were not owned by the company), and
management representations (not corroborated). In addition, some cases involved the
auditor’s failure to examine relevant supporting documents (e.g., examining draft sales
contracts instead of final sales contracts) or the failure to perform steps in the audit program.
It appears that in the SEC’s opinion, the evidence-gathering deficiencies generally involved
situations in which the auditor’s failure to gather key evidence precluded him or her from
detecting a material misstatement.
The second and third most common problems related to lack of due professional care and
lack of appropriate professional skepticism. These represent violations of two of the General
GAAS Standards, and the SEC’s statements were of a global, general nature in most cases
with no specific comments on areas where the skepticism and due care were lacking. Often
when the SEC cited a specific audit problem (e.g., failure to obtain sufficient competent
evidence), the SEC also noted that the auditor failed to exercise due professional care and/or
appropriate professional skepticism. In other cases, the auditor clearly failed to exercise
appropriate due care or professional skepticism because he or she merely accepted
management assertions (e.g., about the valuation of a difficult to measure asset account) at
face value or ignored known management integrity issues.

The fourth most common problem involved misinterpretation or misapplication of GAAP.
The auditor failed to consult or understand the GAAP provisions, or he or she did not apply
GAAP properly. In a number of cases, the AAER cited specific FASB statements or AICPA
guidance that had not been consulted or followed. For example, there were problems related
to APB 20, APB 16, SFAS 34, various AICPA guides, and numerous basic violations of
GAAP (improper asset recording or improper revenue recognition). Often the GAAP
violations related to unusual assets with unique accounting valuation issues. From the
discussion in the AAERs, generally it was difficult to determine whether the GAAP violation
resulted from the auditor’s lack of awareness of GAAP or from the auditor’s improper
application of GAAP.
Audit planning issues represented the fifth most common problem. Three issues that often
were cited in this area were failure to properly consider inherent risks (industry turmoil,
company and management red flags, or difficult accounting issues), failure to recognize risks
associated with non-routine transactions (where the fraud often occurred — often in a period
end adjustment), and failure to prepare a written audit program. In addition, some cases
involved the auditor’s use of a prior-year or standard audit program without making any
adjustments for issues unique to the current audit (e.g., the company just began to sell to
foreign customers with foreign sales constituting a majority of current year sales). Finally,
one case involved an auditor’s agreement to audit certain material items with an eight-day
deadline in order to file financial statements timely with the SEC. This extremely tight time
frame may have contributed to the inadequate planning.

The sixth most common problem was over-reliance on inquiry as a form of evidence.
Auditors often were cited for failing to corroborate management explanations (placing sole
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reliance on the representations of management) and for failing to challenge inconsistent
explanations or explanations that were refuted by other evidence that the auditor already had
gathered. Often the over-reliance on management representations related to subjective
valuations of account balances.
Failure to obtain adequate evidence in support of management estimates represented the
seventh most common problem. Auditors often were cited for failing to gather corroborating
evidence and for failing to challenge key assumptions or methods. Accounts typically
involved in such cases were accounts receivable, investments, loans receivable, inventory
(lower of cost or market issues), plant assets (valuation issues), and natural resources.
Various problems were found with confirmation of accounts receivable, the eighth most
common area. Some cases involved a failure to confirm any or enough receivables, and
others involved lax procedures in the confirmation process that allowed the client to falsify
the confirmation requests. A few cases involved deficiencies with faxed confirmations. The
client provided phony customer fax numbers, intercepted the confirmations, completed them,
and then faxed them back to the auditor. In these cases, the SEC often noted that the auditor
failed to independently verify the legitimacy of the fax telephone number supplied by the
client. In another case, the auditor relied on the client to deliver overnight confirmation
request packages directly to the overnight carrier with no auditor involvement in the process.
Then, when the response rate to the overnight requests far exceeded the response rate to
traditionally mailed requests, the auditor failed to investigate reasons for the drastic change.
Finally, a number of auditors were cited for failing to perform alternate procedures when
confirmations were not returned or were returned with material exceptions.

The ninth most common problem involved failure to recognize or disclose key related
parties. In some cases, the auditor simply was unaware of the related party, while in others
the auditor appeared to willfully conceal the related party’s existence. Often, related party
transactions were used to artificially increase asset values.
The tenth most common problem was over-reliance on internal controls, particularly a failure
to expand testing in light of known control weaknesses. In a number of cases, the auditor
had documented significant control problems in specific areas and then had failed to alter the
audit testing in response to the heightened risk. In other cases, the auditor proceeded with a
fairly typical audit which assumes the presence of an acceptable baseline-level of internal
control despite documenting that the client essentially had no formal controls whatsoever.
The final problems in Table 15 are lack of independence (generally due to the auditor
performing accounting or management functions for the client - often allegedly involved in
recording the fraudulent entries), inadequate supervision and review (generally involving
inadequate partner and second partner reviews; inadequate supervision of staff auditors was
cited in a number of cases), and inadequate or inconsistent working papers.
Tables 16 and 17 present the most common audit problems in audits performed by national
audit firms (Table 16) and non-national audit firms (Table 17).
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Table 16 - Key Problems in National Firm Attempted Audits (n = 10)
Percentage
(Number) of Cases

Problem Area

100% (10 cases)

•

Seeking / obtaining adequate supporting evidence (failing to
gather sufficient evidence)

•

Appropriate level of professional skepticism

•

Due professional care

90% (9)

•

Using inquiry as form of evidence (over-relying on this
form of evidence)

80% (8)

•

Obtaining adequate evidence related to the evaluation of
significant management estimates (failing to gather
sufficient evidence)

70% (7)

•

Interpreting or applying requirements of GAAP

70% (7)

•

Designing audit programs and planning engagement
(inherent risk issues, non-routine transactions)

50% (5)

•

Relying on internal controls (over-relying / failing to react
to known control weaknesses)

•

Supervising and reviewing engagement

30% (3)

•

Preparing working paper documentation (inadequate or
inconsistent working papers)

30% (3)

•

Performing cutoff tests of transactions

30% (3)**

•

Evaluating known audit differences / improperly concluding
that “passed” audit adjustments were immaterial

30% (3)**

** Item does not appear in Table 17, Key Problems in Non-National Firm
Attempted Audits.
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Table 17 - Key Problems in Non-National Firm Attempted Audits (n = 35)
Percentage
(Number) of Cases

Problem Area

74% (26 cases)

•

Seeking / obtaining adequate supporting evidence (failing
to gather sufficient evidence)

•

Due professional care

66% (23)

•

Appropriate level of professional skepticism

49% (17)

•

Interpreting or applying requirements of GAAP

43% (15)

•

Designing audit programs and planning engagement
(inherent risk issues, non-routine transactions)

43% (15)

•

Confirming accounts receivable

31% (11)**

•

Recognizing / disclosing key related parties

31% (11)**

•

Using inquiry as form of evidence (over-relying on this
form of evidence)

•

Independence from client

•

Obtaining adequate evidence related to the evaluation of
significant management estimates (failing to gather
sufficient evidence)

26% (9)

•

Supervising and reviewing engagement

20% (7)

•

Preparing working paper documentation (inadequate or
inconsistent working papers)

20% (7)

29% (10)

29% (10)**

** Item does not appear in Table 16, Key Problems in National Firm
Attempted Audits.

Tables 16 and 17 above separately highlight the most common audit problems involving
national firm auditors and non-national firm auditors. While the findings in the two tables
are fairly consistent, there were some problems that appeared in only one of the two tables.
Three problems were among the most common in cases involving national firm audits, but
not in cases involving non-national firms - over-reliance on internal controls, inadequate
performance of cutoff tests of transactions, and improper evaluation of known audit
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differences. Over-reliance on internal controls might be more common among national firm
auditors due to the nature of the client base generally served by national firms (larger clients
where reliance on controls is a common strategy) and the nature of the audit approaches
employed by the national firms (likely to focus more on risk assessments and control testing,
as opposed to choosing not to rely at all on controls). Cutoff testing issues generally
involved sales transactions. Problems with evaluations of known audit differences centered
around client / management negotiations regarding the materiality of misstatements or the
auditor’s improper treatment of misstatements as immaterial. For cutoff testing and
evaluation of known audit differences, it is not clear why these were more common problems
in the national firm sample.

Three problems were among the most common in cases involving non-national firm audits,
but not in cases involving national firms - inadequate confirming of accounts receivable,
failure to recognize or disclose key related parties, and lack of independence (no violations at
all among national firm auditors).5 The accounts receivable confirmation problems described
earlier represent fundamental errors in the performance of basic audit procedures. Failure to
recognize or disclose key related parties also represents a basic failure on the part of the
auditor. Finally, the independence violations generally involved the auditor’s performance of
accounting or management functions for the client, a scenario probably more likely in a small
client / small audit firm setting.6

Finally, Table 18 presents a host of other alleged audit problems described in the AAERs.
These instances are rare, unusual events, but they provide some insight into the variety of
problems that are possible.

5 Despite the recent scrutiny of the independence of the Big 5 audit firms (recent SEC sanctions against a Big 5
firm for independence violations), the present study did not identify a single case of fraudulent financial
reporting from 1987-1997 that involved a non-independent Big 5 auditor.
6 The 10 national firm clients were substantially larger (median assets of $25 million) than the 35 non-national
firm clients (median assets of $3 million).
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Table 18 - Other Alleged Audit Problems

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•

Inadequate interim reviews (2 cases)
Inadequate review of documents containing audited financial
statements

Auditor misappropriation of $13,000
Auditor assisted in setting up company to conceal criminal’s role
in public works projects
Misleading audit firm letterhead (implied a certain geographic
location and certification — neither was true)

Audit opinion misrepresented scope of work

Auditor issued going-concern report to one government agency
and later issued clean opinion with SEC filing
Auditor failed to withdraw audit opinion even after knowing of
fraud

•

Auditor failed to comply with prior SEC sanctions

•

Auditor prepared the fraudulent entries

•

•

Auditor made false and misleading statements about company
history, owner, and financial condition
Auditor failed to disclaim opinion despite material scope
limitation
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SECTION IV — Implications of the Study
Based on the pattern of results found, in this section we offer implications for auditors and
regulators to consider. These implications are based on the authors’ analysis of the data, as
well as our personal judgment.

A. RELATED TO THE INCIDENCE OF AUDITOR SANCTIONS
Our review of two-thirds of the financial statement fraud cases from 1987-1997 revealed
only 56 financial statement fraud cases in which an auditor was sanctioned by the SEC.
Given the large number of public companies and audit firms associated with quarterly and
annual financial statements filed with the SEC in each of the eleven years, the auditor “defect
rate” in this particular setting is arguably extremely low. When assessing the nature of audit
problems highlighted in the SEC enforcement actions, it is important to remember the rare
nature of these documented audit problems and to carefully consider the costs and benefits of
potential responses to the noted problems.

B. RELATED TO THE NATURE OF THE COMPANIES AND THE FRAUDS

The clients and fraud types involved when auditors were sanctioned by the SEC are quite
different from the larger sample of over 200 frauds examined in the COSO fraud study.
Based on these differences, auditors may want to pay particular attention to several issues.

Nature of the Companies
Due to the very small size of the clients involved when auditors were cited by the SEC, audit
firms should pay particular attention to the risks involved in serving this market segment.
Very small clients may present unique challenges due to a potential lack of baseline-level
internal controls and the potential for domination by one individual in the client’s top
management. In addition, the concentration of companies in the mining / oil and gas
industries highlights the importance of industry expertise and recognition of unique industry
risks, including complex / specialized GAAP treatment issues. As audit firms evaluate
potential new client engagements, they may need to seriously challenge whether existing
firm personnel have the ability to obtain a sufficient level of technical competence to ensure
that the firm can appropriately exercise due professional care in the performance of the
engagement. Policies and guidelines that assist the potential new engagement partner in
conducting an objective assessment (e.g., set aside personal benefits from being the
“rainmaker”) of whether the audit firm has the technical ability to adequately perform the
engagement may be warranted.
Nature of the Control Environment
Cases in which the auditors were cited by the SEC exhibited less frequent CEO and CFO
involvement in the frauds (68 percent of these cases versus 83 percent of the full sample). It
is possible that the SEC is somewhat more forgiving of the audit firm when the fraud has
gone to the highest levels of the organization, given that such frauds may be particularly
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difficult for auditors to detect. In any event, thorough assessment of management integrity
and audit committee oversight is critical. Assessments of top management including detailed
assessments of board of director and audit committee effectiveness may be especially useful
if performed as a part of the client acceptance or continuance evaluation process rather than
waiting to make those assessments after the engagement has been accepted and the auditor is
obtaining the understanding of internal controls. In other words, assessments about the
overriding aspects of the control environment may need to part of client acceptance process,
including discussions about these aspects during successor and predecessor auditor
communications.
Nature of the Frauds

Frauds involving auditor citation by the SEC were weighted toward asset frauds (68 percent)
and away from revenue frauds (only 34 percent). During the time period examined (19871997), it appears that the SEC viewed auditors’ failure to detect asset overstatement frauds
particularly harshly. Fraud cases in which accounts receivable, oil, gas, and minerals, or
investments were misstated appeared to pose the greatest risk to the audit firm. Special care
should be taken in auditing unique investments, particularly when there are specific generally
accepted accounting principles that address those types of investments. As audit clients
move into specialized investment opportunities, such as derivative and hedge transactions
and foreign investments in developing countries, auditors may need to consider whether they
have the ability to competently assess existence, valuation, and rights assertions without the
assistance of an investment specialist.

Despite the SEC’s apparent focus on asset frauds from 1987-1997, there is some indication
that the SEC now is shifting its focus toward revenue frauds. For example, the SEC recently
released Staff Accounting Bulleting No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements,
and many recent SEC enforcement actions have involved revenue recognition problems. As
the U.S. economy continues to move away from companies with a large amount of recorded
assets toward companies with off balance sheet assets (intellectual capital, etc.), this also may
serve to reduce the prominence of asset frauds in enforcement actions against auditors as we
move into the 21st century. Investments in e-business, especially, may create new risk areas.

C. RELATED TO THE ALLEGED AUDIT DEFICIENCIES
Bogus Audits or Auditors

Given the infrequent nature of bogus audits or auditors (11 cases), this does not appear to be
a pervasive problem in the financial community. However, one noteworthy item in this area
is the apparent absence of criminal prosecutions in the 11 such cases examined in this study.
The SEC recently announced an effort to work more closely with federal criminal
prosecutors in bringing criminal charges in egregious financial fraud cases. We would
expect future instances of bogus audits or bogus auditors to be prime candidates for criminal
prosecution.
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Auditor Changes and Early Stage Companies

In the 45 attempted but deficient audits, there was a high instance of auditor changes and
early stage companies. Some unscrupulous managers may attempt to “chum” the audit firms
so as to minimize the probability that the fraud is detected. In other cases, it is simply
difficult for the auditor to maximize the effectiveness of the audit when there is no history to
work from. Auditors need to be alert to the unique risks posed at the beginning of a client
relationship and should be especially vigilant in planning and performing the first few audits,
including rigorous communications with predecessor auditors about management integrity
issues and control environment issues, as discussed previously. Extensive client continuance
processes which involve more than the engagement partners may be warranted in the early
years of a client engagement where the perceived audit risk is viewed as high. And, when
engagement partners obtain information through background checks and other procedures,
they may want to ensure that all audit firm personnel assigned to the engagement are
confidentially informed about any concerns related to management integrity issues. If
information about management integrity concerns is only shared between the engagement
partner, concurrent partner, or managing partner, then lower level engagement staff are at a
disadvantage in having the ability to exercise appropriate levels of due professional care and
professional skepticism.
Former Auditors Employed by the Client
In 11 percent of the 45 attempted audits, there was evidence that a former auditor was
employed in a key financial management position (often CFO or controller). One AAER
explicitly stated that the auditor over-relied on the false representations of his former
colleague. Consistent with the Independence Standards Board’s focus on this issue, auditors
should consider the risks of such relationships and adjust their audit approach accordingly,
particularly when there is some concern that knowledge of the audit firm’s strategy can be
used to mask the presence of a particular type of fraud.
Alleged Audit Problems of a Global Nature

Table 15 summarizes the key problems identified in the 45 attempted audits. The three most
common issues (inadequate evidence, lack of due care, and inadequate professional
skepticism) represent global shortcomings in the audit process or the auditor’s frame of mind
in performing the audit. Perhaps the most appropriate way to address these global issues is
through the audit firms’ sharing of their culture with their professionals. A philosophy such
as “our audit work is high quality, we do not cut comers, and we are skeptical” would
address many of the issues raised in the enforcement releases. A second area to consider
here is the types of incentives created by the audit firm’s performance measurement and
compensation system. In many cases, it appeared that auditors simply chose not to pursue or
consider identified issues because of career advancement or firm compensation pressures. It
is possible that time pressures or other factors (client relations, etc.) contributed to the
auditors’ lack of diligence. And third, as noted previously, communications among
engagement team members about any perceived concerns about management integrity and
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fraud risk should be encouraged to ensure that no audit team member withholds noted
concerns for fear of being considered “over-reactive, paranoid, judgmental, etc.”
Alleged Audit Problems of a Specific Nature

The other 10 problems highlighted in Table 15 all represent more specific audit problems that
may have more specific solutions.

•

Interpreting or applying requirements of GAAP - Technical accounting
problems were cited frequently in the enforcement releases. In addressing this
issue, audit firms may benefit from promoting greater consultation with other
auditors (in-house industry experts, in-house accounting experts) and intranet
access to AICPA/FASB / SEC guidance and GAAP-related publications
(covering all levels of GAAP). Continuing firm training in accounting
requirements and industry nuances is critical. Audit firm personnel may need to
be reminded to consider lower level accounting pronouncements as specified in
SAS No. 69, The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity With Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles in the Independent Auditor’s Report.

•

Designing audit programs and planning engagement (inherent risk issues,
non-routine transactions) - Audit planning problems highlight the need for early
planning and thorough documentation. Auditors may need to be reminded to
focus on the provisions contained in SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, to
ensure that they meet the basic responsibilities (e.g., prepare a written audit
program) of the professional standards related to engagement planning. Again, to
ensure effective audit engagement team communications, all engagement team
personnel may need to be encouraged to read audit planning memoranda and
other planning documents, which help alert all team personnel to unique
engagement issues. In addition, it is critical for auditors to address new or
emerging client risks (inherent risk factors) and to very carefully consider the
planned audit effort regarding non-routine transactions, particularly those
recorded at or near period end outside the normal accounting system (i.e., often
manual adjusting entries). Particular focus on fraud risk characteristics contained
in SAS No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit, is
warranted each year throughout the conduct of the engagement.

•

Using inquiry as form of evidence (over-relying on this form of evidence) The clear message with respect to using inquiry as a form of evidence is that the
auditor needs to carefully support and consider the quality of this evidence. When
the evidence is inconsistent with other audit evidence (including other evidence
based on inquiry), the auditor’s skepticism should be at a maximum level. It may
be necessary to remind auditors that relying on inquiry without any corroboration
at all generally is not acceptable, as described more fully in SAS No. 85,
Management Representations. Once again, auditors should be challenged to
ensure that they do not over-rely on client judgments about complex account
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valuation issues when obtaining independent verification is difficult and timeconsuming.
•

Obtaining adequate evidence related to the evaluation of significant
management estimates (failing to gather sufficient evidence) - Given the
complexity and magnitude of many management estimates, it is imperative that
the auditor challenge the underlying data, the assumptions made, and the methods
used by management or their experts. It is important for the auditor also to
incorporate his or her knowledge of the external environment (industry
conditions, local market conditions, etc.) when evaluating the fairness of key
management estimates as described more fully in SAS No. 57, Auditing
Accounting Estimates. Furthermore, auditors may need to more frequently
engage their own industry experts (either in-house experts or outsiders) to assist in
the evaluation of estimates involving unique assets or transactions less frequently
observed across most audit engagements.

•

Confirming accounts receivable - Given the problems noted with confirmations,
auditors should be sensitive to confirming an adequate portion of the receivables
balance, being very cautious with faxed confirmations (see SAS No. 67, The
Confirmation Process), independently gathering addresses and telephone numbers
of client customers, and performing rigorous alternate procedures when
discrepancies arise.

•

Recognizing / disclosing key related parties - Related party problems
sometimes arise due to a failure to recognize such parties. To address this issue, it
is important for audit firms to highlight RPT issues to the entire audit team as
described in SAS No. 45, Related Parties. The entire team should understand the
importance of identifying RPTs and should have full knowledge of which parties
are related to the client in order to ensure that the client’s financial statements
materially comply with the provisions of FASB Statement No. 57, Related Party
Disclosures.

•

Relying on internal controls (over-relying / failing to react to known control
weaknesses) - A number of cases involved auditors documenting significant
control problems and then failing to adjust the audit plan in light of the control
problems. Two issues that deserve consideration from audit firms are (a) does the
audit approach force the auditor to “map” control problems forward into
additional testing?, and (b) does the emphasis on time budgets create a strong
incentive for auditors not to adjust other audit testing even when control problems
are documented? It is possible that additional decision aids or some change in the
weight placed on meeting the time budget could be helpful in this area to ensure
the audit team complies with the guidance contained in SAS No. 55,
Consideration ofInternal Control in Financial Statement Audit, as amended by
SAS No. 78.
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•

Independence from client - Most of the independence violations involved
smaller audit firms that provided management or accounting services to audit
clients. Audit firms need to carefully consider the nature of bookkeeping services
provided to clients to ensure that the audit firm is not auditing its own work.

•

Supervising and reviewing engagement - Inadequate supervision of staff
auditors was cited in a number of cases. Such cases often involved over-reliance
on staff auditors with no prior audit experience. Continuous oversight of staff
auditors is critical, as described in SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision. In
terms of review, most of the issues dealt with inadequate partner review or second
partner review. In some cases, the engagement partner and the second partner
both were sanctioned by the SEC. Other research in accounting also has
suggested that working paper review by partners sometimes may be inadequate.
In one case the audit manager reluctantly signed-off on audit workpapers due to
perceived pressures being placed on the manager by the engagement partner to
complete the audit. In that case, the audit manager voiced concerns about high
risks of misstatements, but conceded to the pressures being imposed to finish the
engagement. Audit firms may need to evaluate what types of procedures,
incentives, and lack of penalties are noted in firm policies and procedures to
ensure that lower level personnel do not succumb to pressures from more senior
engagement personnel to sign-off on working papers when there are known
concerns about management integrity and fraud risk.

•

Preparing working paper documentation (inadequate or inconsistent
working papers) - Given the apparent trend away from extensive working paper
documentation on the part of some audit firms today, the implication of the SEC
sanctions involving working papers is unclear. At a minimum, it is important for
auditors to review their files for inconsistencies and for areas where a reader
would not be able to assess what testing was done. Guidance contained in SAS
No. 31, Evidential Matter, and SAS No. 41, Working Papers, is pertinent to this
issue, particularly when evidence collected exists or is documented exclusively in
electronic form.

This analysis of fraud-related SEC enforcement actions occurring from January 1987 December 1997 summarizes common engagement characteristics and highlights recurring
deficiencies in the audit process. This study updates knowledge of alleged audit failures
related to financial statement fraud by focusing on alleged audit problems throughout most of
the 1990s. We hope that the summary of findings and the related analysis of implications
will be useful to practitioners who desire to increase audit quality, particularly their detection
of material misstatements due to fraud, and to standard-setters who continually evaluate the
relevance of existing professional guidance on the audit process.
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